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The Battle of Cape Esperance, also known as the Second Battle of Savo Island and, in Japanese sources, as the , took place on 11–12 October 1942 in the Pacific campaign of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and United States Navy. The naval battle was the second of four major surface engagements during the Guadalcanal campaign and took place at the entrance to the strait between Savo Island and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. Cape Esperance is the northernmost point on Guadalcanal, and the battle took its name from this point. On the night of 11 October, Japanese naval forces in the Solomon Islands area—under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa—sent a major supply and reinforcement convoy to their forces on Guadalcanal. The convoy consisted of two seaplane tenders and six destroyers and was commanded by Rear Admiral Takatsugu Jojima. At the same time, but in a separate operation, three heavy cruisers and two destroyers—under the command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō—were to bombard the Allied airfield on Guadalcanal (called Henderson Field by the Allies) with the object of destroying Allied aircraft and the airfield's facilities. Shortly before midnight on 11 October, a U.S force of four cruisers and five destroyers—under the command of Rear Admiral Norman Scott—intercepted Gotō's force as it approached Savo Island near Guadalcanal. Taking the Japanese by surprise, Scott's warships sank one of Gotō's cruisers and one of his destroyers, heavily damaged another cruiser, mortally wounded Gotō, and forced the rest of Gotō's warships to abandon the bombardment mission and retreat. During the exchange of gunfire, one of Scott's destroyers was sunk and one cruiser and another destroyer were heavily damaged. In the meantime, the Japanese supply convoy successfully completed unloading at Guadalcanal and began its return journey without being discovered by Scott's force. Later on the morning of 12 October, four Japanese destroyers from the supply convoy turned back to assist Gotō's retreating, damaged warships. Air attacks by U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field sank two of these destroyers later that day. As with the preceding naval engagements around Guadalcanal, the strategic outcome was inconsequential because neither the Japanese nor United States navies secured operational control of the waters around Guadalcanal as a result of this action. However, the Battle of Cape Esperance provided a significant morale boost to the US Navy after the disaster of Savo Island. ==Background== On 7 August 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The objective was to deny the islands to the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and secure starting points for a campaign to isolate the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The Guadalcanal campaign would last six months.〔Hogue, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', pp. 235–236.〕 Taking the Japanese by surprise, by nightfall on 8 August, the Allied forces, mainly consisting of U.S. Marines, had secured Tulagi and nearby small islands, as well as an airfield under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal (later completed and named Henderson Field). Allied aircraft operating out of Henderson became known as the "Cactus Air Force" (CAF) after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal.〔Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', pp. 14–15 and Shaw, ''First Offensive'', p. 18. Henderson Field was named after Major Lofton R. Henderson, a Marine aviator killed during the Battle of Midway.〕 In response, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army—a corps-sized formation headquartered at Rabaul under Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake—with the task of retaking Guadalcanal. On 19 August, various units of the 17th Army began to arrive on the island.〔Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 96–99, Dull, ''Imperial Japanese Navy'', p. 225.〕 Due to the threat of Allied aircraft, the Japanese were unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver their troops and supplies to the island, and warships were used instead. These ships—mainly light cruisers or destroyers—were usually able to make the round trip down "The Slot" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to air attacks. Delivering troops in this manner, however, prevented most of the heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being delivered. In addition, they expended destroyers that were desperately needed for commerce defense. These high-speed runs occurred throughout the campaign and were later called the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese.〔Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', pp. 202, 210–211.〕 Due to the heavier concentration of Japanese surface combat vessels and their well positioned logistical base at Simpson Harbor, Rabaul, and their victory at the Battle of Savo Island in early August, the Japanese had established operational control over the waters around Guadalcanal at night. However, any Japanese ship remaining within range of American aircraft at Henderson field, during the daylight hours—about —was in danger of damaging air attack. This persisted for the months of August and September 1942. The presence of Admiral Scott's task force at Cape Esperance represented the US Navy's first major attempt to wrest night time operational control of waters around Guadalcanal away from the Japanese.〔Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', pp. 113–114.〕 The first attempt by the Japanese Army to recapture Henderson Field was on 21 August, in the Battle of the Tenaru, and the next, the Battle of Edson's Ridge, from 12–14 September; both failed.〔Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', pp. 141–143, 156–158, 228–246, & 681.〕 The Japanese set their next major attempt to recapture Henderson Field for 20 October and moved most of the 2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions, totalling 17,500 troops, from the Dutch East Indies to Rabaul in preparation for delivering them to Guadalcanal. From 14 September-9 October, numerous Tokyo Express runs delivered troops from the Japanese 2nd Infantry Division as well as General Hyakutake to Guadalcanal. In addition to cruisers and destroyers, some of these runs included the seaplane carrier , which delivered heavy equipment to the island including vehicles and heavy artillery other warships could not carry because of space limitations. The Japanese Navy promised to support the Army's planned offensive by delivering the necessary troops, equipment, and supplies to the island, and by stepping up air attacks on Henderson Field and sending warships to bombard the airfield.〔Rottman, ''Japanese Army'', p. 61; Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 152; Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', pp. 224, 251–254, 266–268, & 289–290; Dull, ''Imperial Japanese Navy'', p. 225–226; and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', pp. 132 & 158.〕 In the meantime, Major General Millard F. Harmon—commander of United States Army forces in the South Pacific—convinced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley—overall commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific—that the Marines on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next expected Japanese offensive. Thus, on 8 October, the 2,837 men of the 164th Infantry Regiment from the U.S. Army's Americal Division boarded ships at New Caledonia for the trip to Guadalcanal with a projected arrival date of 13 October.〔Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 293; Cook, ''Cape Esperance'', pp. 19–20; Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', pp. 147–148; and Dull, ''Imperial Japanese Navy'', p. 225.〕 To protect the transports carrying the 164th to Guadalcanal, Ghormley ordered Task Force 64 (TF 64), consisting of four cruisers (, , , and ) and five destroyers (, , , , and ) under U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, to intercept and combat any Japanese ships approaching Guadalcanal and threatening the convoy. Scott conducted one night battle practice with his ships on 8 October, then took station south of Guadalcanal near Rennell Island on 9 October, to await word of any Japanese naval movement toward the southern Solomons.〔Cook, ''Cape Esperance'', pp. 16 and 19–20; Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', pp. 295–297; Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', pp. 148–149; and Dull, ''Imperial Japanese Navy'', p. 225. Since not all of the Task Force 64 warships were available, Scott's force was designated as Task Group 64.2. The U.S. destroyers were from Squadron 12, commanded by Captain Robert G. Tobin in ''Farenholt''.〕 Continuing with preparations for the October offensive, Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa's Eighth Fleet staff, headquartered at Rabaul, scheduled a large and important Tokyo Express supply run for the night of 11 October. ''Nisshin'' would be joined by the seaplane carrier to deliver 728 soldiers, four large howitzers, two field guns, one anti-aircraft gun, and a large assortment of ammunition and other equipment from the Japanese naval bases in the Shortland Islands and at Buin, Bougainville, to Guadalcanal. Six destroyers, five of them carrying troops, would accompany ''Nisshin'' and ''Chitose''. The supply convoy—called the "Reinforcement Group" by the Japanese—was under the command of Rear Admiral Takatsugu Jojima. At the same time but in a separate operation, the three heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 (CruDiv6)—, , and , under the command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō—were to bombard Henderson Field with special explosive shells with the object of destroying the CAF and the airfield's facilities. Two screening destroyers— and —accompanied CruDiv6. Since U.S. Navy warships had yet to attempt to interdict any Tokyo Express missions to Guadalcanal, the Japanese were not expecting any opposition from U.S. naval surface forces that night.〔Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', pp. 295–296; Hackett, ''HIJMS Aoba: Tabular Record of Movement''; Cook, ''Cape Esperance'', pp. 31 and 57; Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 149–151; D'Albas, ''Death of a Navy'', p. 183; and Dull, ''Imperial Japanese Navy'', p. 226. ''CombinedFleet.com'' states Jojima commanded the reinforcement convoy. Other accounts, however, state the commanding officer of ''Nisshin'' commanded the convoy and Jojima was not present. Jojima may have issued orders to the convoy from elsewhere in the Solomon Islands or from Rabaul.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of Cape Esperance」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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